Tag: Social Systems Theory

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46. When Cooperation becomes Dangerous

When Cooperation becomes Dangerous

We often assume that harmful social movements succeed because people are misinformed, irrational, or “don’t know the facts.” But knowing the truth is sometimes not enough to avoid this danger. History, and current events, suggest something more unsettling.

Many people do recognise deception. Many are sceptical. And yet socially harmful dynamics still emerge, mobilise, and sometimes gain power.

In a new article, I explore this puzzle using a systems perspective rather than a political or moral one. The central idea is simple but uncomfortable: social failure is often driven not by false belief, but by misdirected coupling; i.e., strong local alignment to individuals or groups whose behaviour undermines wider social viability.

Small, tightly committed groups can dominate outcomes even when most people privately disagree. Crowd dynamics and emotional contagion can temporarily override reflexive judgement. And harmful patterns can reproduce across generations through social learning and imitation, especially among the young.

This means that fact-checking, media literacy, and moral exhortation, while important, are often insufficient. The article argues that what is increasingly needed is a different kind of education:

  • awareness of psychological and social pathologies;
  • understanding of how coupling and crowd dynamics work; and
  • motivational reflexivity: the capacity to regulate behaviour under emotional and social pressure.

This is not about ideology or politics. It is about recognising system failure modes and learning how to constrain them before they propagate.

The full article is available as a downloadable PDF here:
https://rational-understanding.com/sst

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45. From Organisms to Nations: A Systems–Evolutionary Perspective on Social Development

From Organisms to Nations: A Systems–Evolutionary Perspective on Social Development

Human societies now operate at a scale unprecedented in history, yet they struggle to coordinate effectively in the face of environmental, social, and geopolitical crises. Climate change, institutional breakdown, misinformation, and persistent inequality are often treated as separate problems, to be solved through better politics, better technology, or better ethics. This paper starts from a different premise: that many of these difficulties are not failures of intention or morality, but symptoms of an unfinished stage of social development.

Using ideas from systems theory and evolutionary biology, the paper explores the possibility that human societies are still undergoing a process of evolutionary assembly, similar in important ways to the biological evolution that produced complex organisms. Social systems, ranging from individuals and organisations to nations, exhibit recurring structural patterns, but as they grow larger they tend to become less integrated even as their power increases. Functional specialisation expands what societies can do, but integration and control often lag behind.

The paper also argues that human needs themselves emerged in a developmental sequence, existence, relatedness, then growth, and that societies tend to follow the same pattern. When social systems prioritise growth before basic needs for security, belonging, and integration are met, instability and pathology predictably follow. From this perspective, phenomena such as criminality, institutional fragility, and environmental overshoot are not anomalies, but signals of insufficient integration at larger scales. Rather than proposing political solutions or institutional blueprints, the paper offers a way of understanding where humanity may be in its social evolutionary trajectory. It identifies two key barriers to further development, informational breakdown and weak systemic commitment, and suggests that the long-term viability of human societies depends on new forms of large-scale coordination and regulation grounded in accurate information, shared understanding, and recognition of deep interdependence.

The full paper can be downloaded in pdf format at https://rational understanding.com/sst

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18, The Relationship between Symbolic Reasoning Causality and Systems

The Relationship between Symbolic Reasoning, Causality and Systems

Some time ago, I published a paper proposing that the universal disciplines of natural language, mathematics, logic, causality, and systems theory might be unified within a single formal language.

Prior to that work, I had developed an enhanced form of set theory, Symbolic Reasoning, which successfully unified natural language, logic, and mathematics. While this framework was able to account for causality and information, it did so in a way that was both complex and, to my mind, unsatisfactory. It also did not yet extend to systems theory.

More recently, over the Christmas period, I arrived at the key insight needed to incorporate systems theory into the framework. In doing so, I was also able to greatly simplify how Symbolic Reasoning represents causality, capability, and information. What had previously required elaborate constructions could now be expressed directly and transparently in systems terms.

These extensions to Symbolic Reasoning are described in a PDF available for download here:

https://rational-understanding.com/my-books#srandsystems

To fully understand the framework, readers will also need a copy of The Mathematics of Language and Thought, both volumes of which are available for download in PDF format on the same page, immediately below.

Why this matters

Much of modern thought is fragmented across disciplines that use different languages to describe the same underlying phenomena. Causality, systems, information, meaning, and mathematics are often treated as separate domains, even though they repeatedly intersect in science, engineering, and everyday reasoning. The framework presented here matters because it offers a single, coherent formal language in which these domains can be expressed together, without metaphor or hand-waving. By grounding meaning, causality, and systems in shared symbolic structures, it becomes possible to reason more clearly about complex systems (natural, social, and artificial) and to see connections that are otherwise obscured by disciplinary boundaries.

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11. The Hierarchy of Organising Principles Uncategorized

The Hierarchy of Organising Principles

I haven’t posted for a while because I have been working on this paper. It is quite long and contains many diagrams. So, I have produced it in pdf format and you can download it via the following link https://rational-understanding.com/my-books#hierarchy-of-organising-principles.

The paper presents a comprehensive hypothesis that seeks to explain the nature of reality and how humans understand it, integrating foundational concepts from critical realism, systems theory, and causality. The hypothesis holds that reality can be viewed as a fractal-like structure, generated by underlying organising principles that operate at various ranks in a hierarchy. Starting from acausal foundational principles, the paper explores how systems interact, transfer matter, energy, and information, and contribute to the complexity observed at different levels of organisation. The hypothesis extends to the idea that human understanding is structured by organising principles that differ from reality’s, leading to distinct layers of comprehension reflected in scientific disciplines. The paper suggests that integrating these principles may help bridge gaps between disciplines, such as the disconnect between social sciences and the biological sciences. This unification has the potential to deepen our understanding of both the natural world and human social behaviour, while identifying new pathways for societal change.

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38. A Theory of Society Derived from the Principles of Systems, Psychology, Ecology and Evolution Part 3

A Theory of Society Derived from the Principles of Systems, Psychology, Ecology, & Evolution (Part 3)

This paper is open access and can be downloaded free of charge in pdf format at https://rational-understanding.com/my-books#theory-of-society-3

Part 1 of this series of papers focussed largely on the principles of systems, ecology, and evolution to describe the ways in which individuals and organisations of all types interact, and so, create the structure of society. That is, how they exchange satisfiers and contra-satisfiers; satisfiers being those things that increase the level of satisfaction of our needs, and contra-satisfiers those things that decrease their level of satisfaction. However, Part 1 did not account for the choices that we make in the ways that we interact.

Human needs motivate our behaviour, but beliefs determine what form that behaviour takes. Although needs are fundamental to everything that has a function, beliefs are an emergent property of humanity, and a consequence of our ability to manipulate information and our highly social nature. However, beliefs can be true, or they can be false. In observing reality, we make mistakes and frequently distort it to satisfy our needs or avoid our contra-needs.

Part 3 will, therefore, discuss the psychological and social psychological aspects of our nature, particularly the beliefs, psychological defence mechanisms, and their socio-cultural reinforcement, that lead to our choices.

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33. Evolution from a Social Systems Perspective (Part 2)

Evolution from a Social Systems Perspective, Part 2

A living holon is any organism, any group of organisms, or any group of groups that work together with a common purpose. Human holons are a subset of living holons. They include individual people and organisations of all types from clubs, through businesses and nations, to the global community.

All living holons are motivated to acquire benefits or satisfiers and to avoid disbenefits or contra-satisfiers. However, most decisions have both benefits and disbenefits. That is, if implemented, they yield both satisfiers and contra-satisfiers. Rarely are they entirely beneficial. So, in deciding whether to act, living holons carry out a form of risk benefit cost analysis. The disbenefits are weighted, mitigated, and deducted from the benefits to yield a net benefit or disbenefit. That is, an overall satisfier or contra-satisfier. If there is an overall satisfier, then the living holon will act. If there is an overall contra-satisfier, it will not.

The benefits of an action normally apply to the actor, but the disbenefits can apply to any party. The more socially distant the latter from the actor, the lower the weighting given by the actor to the disbenefit. Also, in the case of people, the less empathic and the darker the traits of the actor, the lower the weighting given to disbenefits for others.

If an action that yields both a benefit and a disbenefit becomes established, and if they affect the ability of the holon or holons that experience them to survive and procreate, then they will become evolutionary drivers for that holon or those holons. If both are experienced by the actor, then both become evolutionary drivers for the actor. If they apply to different holons, then they become individual evolutionary drivers for those holons. These drivers will cause the benefit to be acquired ever more efficiently and the disbenefit to be avoided ever more effectively. Thus, the holon or holons will become ever more specialised.

Risk benefit cost analysis is not necessarily a conscious process and can be one that is programmed into a species by evolution. An example is the cognitive bias in human decision making identified by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman D., 2011). Cognitive biases are shortcuts to decision making carried out under the pressure of circumstances. They are often not entirely logical and are certainly not consciously considered, but they do have the advantage of being correct much of the time. We use them when there is no time to consciously review our decisions before events decide the outcome for us. It is more beneficial to take an action quickly and unconsciously, even if there is only a limited likelihood of success, than to engage in conscious reasoning and, during that process, experience failure.

The effect of the benefits and disbenefits of an activity on a single species can clearly be seen in one of nature’s most delightful sights, the murmuration, or synchronised flight, of a flock of starlings. A murmuration over Brighton Pier can be seen here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-eEobkfMC_4 .

The purpose of a murmuration is to attract starlings, who have dispersed during the day, into large groups for overnight roosting. If you watch carefully, you will see smaller groups joining larger ones and the latter steadily growing. Once a group is large enough, the birds will descend to roost together. This provides them with safety in numbers against predators. In other words, they cooperate to gain a mutual benefit or satisfier. There is no doubt that this instinctive behaviour has an evolutionary basis. Those that roost together are more likely to survive and propagate their genome than those that do not, and so, the genetic drivers for this behaviour propagate through the population over time.

There is, however, a downside. Flying together in close formation poses a risk of collision, injury, or death, and thus, a disbenefit or contra-satisfier. Mitigation of this disbenefit is carried out by spatial distancing. Using computer modelling the Italian Physicist, Professor Giorgio Parisi, found that the birds synchronise their flight by co-ordinating only with those adjacent to them (Parisi G., 2023). The skill involved is one of flying as closely to their neighbours as possible without colliding. This, in turn, is determined by their ability to respond to changes in proximity and direction before a collision occurs. There is no doubt that this skill also has an evolutionary basis. Those birds lacking the necessary genetic drivers will have collided and perished whilst those with them will have survived and procreated. Again, the necessary genetic drivers will have propagated through the population over time.

A colleague in LinkedIn, Fiona Clubb, describes the following event. “… about 25 years ago in Birmingham, England. I was competing in a Western Equestrian national show and was in a very small collecting ring with around 30 other competitors. There was very little room but the riders were all practicing their art, some going sideways, some at a flat out gallop, some just standing, and others spinning on the spot at high speed. It was complete chaos, yet nobody came close to colliding. They were all in control, and totally aware of space as it opened up for them to make their move. I have never seen anything like it. It was like a chaotic murmuration. The only protocol in place to coordinate the process was the riders’ mental skill and their ability to adapt…”. (Clubb F., 2024)

In this example, the riders were acquiring the mutual benefit of practicing their skills. However, as a part of this they also had to avoid the contra-satisfier of collisions. Again, this disbenefit was avoided by spatial distancing.

On the streets of a busy city, dense crowds of people walk in many different directions but, unless they are using smartphones, collisions are rare. In the same way as the starlings and the horses and their riders, people show a remarkable ability to avoid them. Indeed, in the branch of psychology known as proxemics, if one person enters another’s defensible space this is regarded as a threat. (Hall, E.T. 1966). The ability to avoid one another’s defensible space is almost certainly an evolved trait. It may also be an evolved trait in horses which are a herd species. So, it is likely that, in Birmingham, the horses were contributing as much to the avoidance of collisions as their riders.

Spatial separation can also be observed in the niches occupied by different species. For example, the insect species on a tree are separated according to the parts of the tree. Some occupy the foliage, some the branches, and others the trunk. All benefit from being a part of the larger ecosystem but maintain spatial separation to avoid direct conflict.

The same is true of human sub-cultures. The members of a sub-culture will gather together to avoid conflict with others but will remain in the same locale as the main culture and reap its benefits for so long as it tolerates them.

In human affairs, functional difference can, however, replace spatial distance. For example, fast food outlets will tend to congregate in the same location, and this acts as a mutual satisfier by attracting customers to that location. However, we do not see two fish and chip shops next door to one another. This is because the same function in the same location would create competition that is likely to become negative and lead to conflict. This, in turn, would ultimately lead to the failure of at least one competitor. The weaker competitor would be taken over or driven out by the more successful one. So, the outlets differ in function: fish and chips, Indian, Chinese, burger bars, coffee shops, and so on. There is some competition in terms of value for money, but no immediate competition in terms of the service provided. Each outlet shares the mutual benefit of cooperation and avoids the potential disbenefit of conflict by functional distancing.

Competition and takeovers are common in the business world when two organisations have a similar function. Thus, there is a tendency for functional distance to develop between businesses in the same market. This minimises conflict but can lead to the formation of monopolies. However, because monopolies can discourage innovation and abuse their powers, most governments legislate and regulate to prevent them. Departments or components within an organisation are, however, often monopolies. This is because there is no market choice, and the cost of duplication would outweigh the benefits of competition. It is, however, possible to introduce competition by splitting departments geographically or by outsourcing an activity to more than one contractor.

In summary, the decisions of living holons, human or otherwise, involve both satisfiers and contra-satisfiers, and so, an often innate form of risk benefit cost analysis is carried out when deciding whether to act. If an activity becomes established, then its benefits and disbenefits can act as evolutionary drivers for the holons that experience them. This process can be seen in both humans and other animals. It can also be seen in individuals and groups. Finally, it can be seen in both biological and cultural evolution. As well as learning to take decisions using these analyses, people also take them intuitively, and so, our genetic inheritance plays a part. Thus, human behaviour, although more complex than that of other species, is not as different or as divorced from nature as we sometimes like to believe. The principles of evolution still underpin our behaviour.

References

Clubb, F. (2024). Jobs for Horses, LinkedIn. https://uk.linkedin.com/in/fiona-clubb-47074095

Hall, Edward T. (1966). “The Hidden Dimension”. Anchor Books. ISBN 978-0-385-08476-5.

Kahneman, D. (2011). “Thinking, Fast and Slow”. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-0-374-27563-1.

Parisi, G. (2023). “In a Flight of Starlings”. UK: Penguin Random House. Allen Lane.

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27. How Cooperation Can Fail (Part 2)

How Cooperation Can Fail Part 2

A colleague in LinkedIn has posted the following comment on my previous article: “Co-operation fails when the demands of the goal are put ahead of the needs of the relationships involved in the cooperative”. Although this comment uses different language to mine, I agree with it, and my reasons are given in this article. The comment also has some interesting implications that I will also explore here: why the needs of cooperative groups are so similar to the needs of individuals, and how cooperation can become coercion.

My explanation begins with cognitive physicalist philosophy, one of the key principles of social systems theory. The cognitive component of this philosophy holds that the universe is infinitely complex, but our minds are not. Therefore, to understand the universe we are obliged to mentally represent it in a simplified way. One of the ways we do this is by using holons. These are things whose structure we recognise due to its recurrence. Holons enable us to recognise threats and opportunities from experience or from knowledge passed on by others. We respond to holons in a way conducive to our survival and procreation, and so our ability to recognise them has an evolutionary source.

The physicalist component of cognitive physicalist philosophy holds that everything is physical, and nothing metaphysical. In other words, everything comprises matter or energy in space-time, and there is nothing other than that. If we also accept Einstein’s proposition that matter is organised energy, then this simplifies, yet further, to the premise that everything is energy in space-time.

There are two outputs from this philosophy of significance for social systems theory.

Firstly, information is physical in nature. It exists at source, i.e., in the original physical thing that we are thinking of or communicating about. Information at source is the structure or organisation that we recognise in that thing. Information at source can be translated into a simplified form capable of being held in and manipulated by our minds. This simplified form can be an icon or image, or it can be a symbol or word. This icon or symbol is also organised matter or energy that represents a holon in the physical universe. We can also create external representations of these internal ones in the form of drawings, words, etc. This enables us to communicate information to others. Both translations are fraught with difficulties, of course, but I will not expand on that here.

Secondly, even abstract things such as relationships and characteristics are physical in nature, rather than metaphysical. For example, a characteristic is the aggregate of all physical things that can be said to have it. Justice, for example, is the aggregate of all just acts. To cite another example, a relationship between two things is the aggregate of those two things. It exists only for as long as the characteristic that defines the relationship applies to those things. This implies that co-operation is physical in nature. A relationship does not exist independently of the two parties who, for example, co-operate. Rather, it IS those two parties for so long as they have the characteristic of cooperating with one another.

We recognise cooperative groups because they occur frequently in society. Parties who cooperate form a larger holon comprising several smaller ones. These smaller ones are the individuals who cooperate, plus any other living things, such as horses, and any artifacts, such as computers, necessary for the co-operative endeavour. Even individual people rely on other living things and artifacts. Examples include guide dogs for the blind and heart pacemakers. So, the needs of these things must be included with those of the individual person.

Another principle of social systems theory is that holons comprising more than one person have much the same range of needs as those of a single individual. This is because the needs of these larger holons comprise an aggregate of the needs of its component parts, i.e., the individuals concerned, and any other living things or artifacts necessary for cooperation. When the needs of these components are aggregated, they yield those of the cooperative group and no new needs emerge.

In summary, individuals have needs, relationships between them have needs, and groups of individuals have needs. They are all much the same as the needs of individuals.

Our growing reliance on artifacts, and where this may be leading is, of course, a significant topic in its own right. However, this will be discussed in a future article.

Evolution has resulted in people who carry out a form of risk-benefit-cost analysis when translating their needs into behaviour. Emotion plays a part in this. If a situation lowers the level of satisfaction of our needs, then we will experience negative emotions, e.g., grief. On the other hand, if the situation increases the level of satisfaction of our needs, then our emotions will be positive, e.g., happiness. These emotions affect our behaviour. If we believe that the effort involved in satisfying a need will outweigh the benefit to be gained, then we will wish to avoid negative emotions and will not voluntarily behave in that way.

Because larger holons have much the same needs, albeit aggregates, they follow the same rule. If the aggregate effort of the cooperative outweighs the aggregate benefit to be gained, then some parties in the cooperative endeavour will inevitably suffer a net disbenefit. They will, therefore, no longer cooperate voluntarily. So, co-operation fails when the aggregate cost of pursuing the mutual goal exceeds the benefits to be gained.

This has an interesting implication. If unsatisfiable needs exist, then cooperation with people who pursue them without restraint is impossible. An example of an unsatisfiable need is absolute power. No matter how much we have, there will always be someone or some group with more. The same is true of wealth. If we have people who prioritise their need for wealth or power and pursue it without restraint, then this will consume endless resources. However, the satisfiers that any cooperative can generate are finite. So, if co-operation were attempted with such people, then ultimately, we would face a situation in which the costs to us outweigh the benefits. Thus, any cooperation would fail.

In practice, for cooperation to be sustained, it is necessary to work within the constraints of the benefits that can be gained from it. Furthermore, the benefits generated by co-operation must be shared reasonably equitably so that all parties experience a net benefit. In practice, this is what good leaders do. It is also what dark leaders do – up to a point.

Once sufficient wealth and power is gained via cooperative means, then coercion becomes possible. Indeed, in the case of people who pursue power or wealth without constraint, it becomes inevitable. Once coercion becomes common practice, what may previously have been a democratic society becomes an authoritarian one, with extremes of wealth and power and extremes of powerlessness and poverty.

To avoid such a society, it is necessary to place constraints on the pursuit of wealth and power. These must be built into our governmental and democratic processes. Not everyone seems to realise this, unfortunately.

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26. How Cooperation Can Fail (Part 1)

How Cooperation Can Fail

In this article, I use social systems theory to explain how cooperative arrangements can fail. I will use the topical example of labour relations in business to illustrate this, although there are many other examples such as cooperative relationships in families, between friends, and between nations. The example that I have chosen reveals little that we do not already know from experience. However, this is not the purpose of the article. Rather, its purpose is to demonstrate how the underlying principles of social systems theory result in a model that reflects reality.

The example began as a series of equations, each of which, drew on the principles of ecology to describe a relationship between two unspecified parties. The principles of evolution were then used to link the equations and demonstrate how these relationships could change over time. Finally, the series of equations was translated into the text below.

The example is limited to a discussion of relationships within the private business sector. This sector interacts with many others such as education, healthcare, government, the legal sector, and so on. For the purposes of this article, only a brief discussion of interactions with government is included. Interactions with other sectors have not.

Cooperation, or as it is known in ecology, mutualism, occurs when two parties work together with a common purpose. The parties involved can be individuals or organisations of any type or size, including families, businesses, voluntary organisations, governments, and nations. Their purpose is usually to gain satisfiers or avoid contra-satisfiers for their mutual benefit. The source of these satisfiers or contra-satisfiers is a third party or the general environment. Satisfiers are those external things that satisfy the needs of an individual organism, group of organisms or species. Contra-satisfiers on the other hand are external things that reduce the level of satisfaction of those needs. For example, the employees and employers in a business cooperate to manufacture and sell goods to their market for a profit. This profit is a satisfier for the needs of both parties and is shared between them for their mutual benefit.

Initially, two parties in a cooperative arrangement may be relatively equal in power. However, as time progresses, one invariably gains greater power, and so, the benefits of the arrangement are shared less equitably. In a business, for example, employers typically come to hold greater power. However, there have been cases in which, through trade union organisation, employees have come to do so instead.

Two things can then occur. Those with greatest power can seek ever greater power, and thus, ever more inequitable distribution of the benefits of cooperation. Alternatively, or additionally, a shortage of the mutual satisfier can occur. For example, the market for the business’s product may decline.

There is a threshold above which parties will voluntarily cooperate, and below which they will not. For example, if employees are to co-operate with employers, then the wages gained from employment must be sufficient to satisfy their needs. Employers, on the other hand, must be able to satisfy their own personal needs and those of the business. If one party takes too much of the benefits and/or if the market for their product fails, then the other party may find the benefits of co-operation insufficient. The owners may no longer be able or willing to pay enough to make employment worthwhile, or the returns for the employers may no longer be sufficient to make the business worthwhile. So, one party may find itself cooperating involuntarily with the other. For example, the employer may, in effect, be taking the employees’ labour against their will, although the reverse is also possible.

When one party takes a satisfier from another and the other party a) needs it to satisfy their needs and b) has no resilience or rainy-day surplus such as savings or capital, then the former party is, in effect, imposing a contra-satisfier on the latter. As a consequence, there is a risk of conflict, and three courses of action are possible.

To avoid conflict, the weaker party can move elsewhere. For example, employees can resign and look for alternative employment, or employers can close the business. Cooperation then ceases. In ecology, this is known as neutralism.

Alternatively, because the imposition of a contra-satisfier by one party on another normally results in reciprocation, the two parties can engage in conflict. The purpose of reciprocation is, of course, to coerce the employer or employees into a more equitable apportionment of the business’s benefits.

Finally, the one party can accept harmful exploitation by the other. It is an objective fact that, in ecology, harmful exploitation is known as predation or parasitism. These terms are not intended to be disparaging.

Much depends on the relative power of the two parties. If the harmful exploitation of employees is widespread, there may be nowhere for employees to move to. If general employee power is too great, there may be no alternative business opportunity for the employers. In these circumstances, the only options that remain are conflict or the acceptance of exploitation. If either party has so much power that conflict with them will inevitably fail, then only the final option, an acceptance of exploitation, remains.

Co-operation can, of course, fail even when the parties are relatively equal in power and the benefits of a business are shared reasonably equitably. If these benefits should fail for any reason, e.g., market collapse, competition, etc., then, providing they have reserves of the necessary satisfiers, both employers and employees may find themselves in the position of being harmlessly exploited for a while. A reasonable degree of resilience by both parties is, therefore, needed to retain co-operative arrangements during short term market downturns, etc. However, if these reserves become exhausted, then harmless exploitation becomes harmful, i.e., a contra-satisfier, and so, co-operation fails.

The following conclusions can be drawn from this example. If employers gain too much power and are unwilling to share the benefits of businesses sufficiently equitably to satisfy the needs of their employees, then they will fail to gain the latter’s voluntary cooperation. Conflict can then become widespread and lead to economic failure with disbenefits for all. Alternatively, harmful exploitation can become widespread, and we can come to live in an authoritarian society. Employers can, of course, tread a careful line and share benefits just sufficiently equitably to make employee cooperation worthwhile. However, because there will be no employee resilience, when a shock to the business occurs, this can quickly cause cooperation to be lost.

Conversely, if employees gain too much power and demand excessive pay, then this can prevent growth, reduce business resilience, and thus place, the business’s continued existence in jeopardy. Again, co-operation will break down, and the benefits to both parties will be lost. If this situation becomes widespread, then only those employees who are organised will benefit, and then only in the short term. Ultimately, economies will fail to grow, and the benefits of this growth will be lost. In the extreme, economies can collapse, and poverty can become endemic.

The way forward, therefore, is a middle road in which the balance of power between employers and employees is optimised. This is the role of national government which, in an ideal world, should exercise it scientifically, objectively, non-ideologically and without undue influence from either employers or employees. It is worth mentioning that corrective legislation to curtail excessive power of either employers or employees should not be retained indefinitely. Rather, it should be rolled back once an optimum balance is achieved. Failing that, the optimum will be overshot, and the power of the other party will steadily increase. If they are to retain an optimum balance, governments should keep their eye on the ball and amend legislation as necessary.

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25. The Causes of Conflict

The Causes of Conflict

In this article, I will discuss from a social systems perspective the causes of all types of conflict. This perspective is a very general one and may appear somewhat abstract, therefore. There are many conflicts in the world today and it would be easy to give examples. However, it is also true that we tend to take sides. So, to avoid any suggestion of that, I will leave the reader to apply this general theory to any conflicts that they are aware of.

Firstly, I will define the basic concepts used in this article and describe their significance.

The term holon was coined by Arthur Koestler in his 1967 book, The Ghost in The Machine. It refers to any entity that can be recognised as a whole in itself, and which constitutes part of a larger whole. In social systems theory the fundamental component of society or social holon is any individual or group of people who work together with a common purpose. They can be an organisation of any type, and can range in size and extent from an individual, through clubs, businesses, sectors, political parties, governments, nations, and groups of nations, to the global community.

The genome comprises all genetic information held by an organism. In conjunction with the environment, it determines the physical manifestation of the organism. It also determines the nature of the organism’s needs for existence and procreation.

Culture is also information. It is held in the minds of individuals and, in conjunction with the environment, determines the nature of society. Culture comprises values, norms, beliefs, knowledge, and symbols. Values are those things that we hold good or bad; norms are socially desirable, acceptable, or unacceptable forms of behaviour; and symbols are those things, such as rituals, modes of dress, etc., that indicate our membership of a group.

Function is the common purpose of a group and the reason for its existence. It too is information held in the minds of individuals. This is evidenced by the fact that disagreement about the function of a group is relatively common.

Satisfiers are those external things that increase the level of satisfaction of our needs. Contra-satisfiers, on the other hand, are those things that reduce that level of satisfaction. Satisfiers and contra-satisfiers may be material, energy, or information both true and false. They can also be relationships between social holons. The status of a satisfier or contra-satisfier can be entrenched, precarious, latent, or absent. Entrenched means inextricably present in a situation; precarious means present but not guaranteed in the future; and latent means in the form of a promise or threat. The promise of a satisfier and the threat of a contra-satisfier both play a significant role in human affairs.

Genome, culture, and function are determinants of the needs of individuals or groups, as described in the table below.

It is often the case that people who have the most in common and who live closest to one another engage in conflict. The explanation for this is as follows.

Suppose we have two social holons, X and Y. The more similar their determinants, the more similar their needs. Individual human beings are, of course, genetically very similar and our existence needs are therefore almost identical. The functions of larger social holons or organisations are more diverse, and it is rarer, but still possible, for two to have identical needs. The relatedness needs of individuals, i.e., how we interact with others, are determined in part by the genome and in part by culture. This is evidenced by the fact that some cultures value the extended family more than others. Again, the relatedness needs of larger social holons are more diverse. They are influenced by a combination of the holon’s function and culture. Finally, the growth needs of both individuals and larger social holons are influenced largely by culture. Growth needs can be very diverse in both cases.

The more alike the needs of X and Y, the more similar the satisfiers of those needs. The more similar those satisfiers and the closer X and Y are geographically, the less likely it is that those satisfiers will be sufficient for both. X and Y then have three options. They can either:

  • cooperate to gain greater mutual access to the satisfiers;
  • one party can move to another geographical location, so that the satisfiers are sufficient for both; or
  • the two parties can compete for the satisfier. It is this that can lead to conflict.

The way in which competition evolves depends on the cultures of the competing parties. This is determined in large part by their leadership. Leaders’ attitudes lie on a scale from entirely selfish to entirely selfless. This is influenced by their personality traits. Greater empathy leads to greater selflessness. Dark traits, such as those held by narcissists, psychopaths and Machiavellians, lead to greater selfishness. The more selfish a group the more likely it is to regard the other as a potential threat or contra-satisfier.

A group’s culture is also determined by the social transmission of information and the reinforcement of beliefs by socialisation, i.e., reward for compliance and censure for non-compliance. This information exists on at least three levels, each building on the information in the one below:

Level 1. Whether or not a threat or contra-satisfier can be physically observed. This information is normally true, although it is possible to misinterpret observed events.

Level 2. Beliefs about the existence or otherwise of a Level 1 threat, as passed from one individual to another. This information can be true or false. It is not uncommon for people to propagate false information in their self-interest. It is also not uncommon for ideologies to be based on false information.

Level 3. Beliefs about Level 2 beliefs and their effect on a culture. For example, concerns about false beliefs propagated by an ideology.

These two factors, i.e., the selfishness or selflessness of a culture and its beliefs about any threat posed by the other party, affect the likelihood of competition becoming conflict. The more selfish the individual or group and the stronger their belief about the threat posed by a competitor, the more likely it is that they will behave in a way that causes a contra-satisfier or threat to that competitor. Conversely, the more selfless a group and the weaker their belief in any threat posed by the other party, the less likely they are to behave in that way.

Once one party, physically imposes a contra-satisfier on the other, then the threat perceived by the other party becomes real. They will often reciprocate, and conflict will ensue. Unless there are controls, external or otherwise, a feedback process will occur in which the contra-satisfiers that the two parties impose on one another escalate until the conflict becomes violent.

It can be seen from the above description that there are many ways in which either party, or a third one, can intervene to prevent conflict. This does, of course, require an understanding of the processes involved, and intervention at an early stage before violence becomes inevitable and unpreventable. Unfortunately, it is also the case that parties can intervene to make conflict more likely, and those with beneficial intent must be cognisant of that too.

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15. Uncontrolled Social Feedback and How to Control It

Uncontrolled Social Feedback & How to Control It

In his 1980 paper “A Confluence of Feedback Loops in Social and Educational Structure: (in the context of developed and developing countries)”, M. M. Gupta of the Systems Science Research Laboratory, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, stated the following.

“In the case of inanimated physical systems, it is a well-known empirical fact that unrestrained increase in the degree of positive feedback between the various components of a system leads to instability, oscillations, and eventually to a failure. There is a warning in this that cannot be ignored: Our socio-economic systems, too, are likely to face an eventual catastrophic failure if the growth in the degree of interdependence within them is not accompanied by better planning, coordination, and – what might be much less palatable – restraints on our freedom… In fact, in some of the advanced societies of so-called developed countries, with libertarian traditions – in which there is an understandable aversion to planning and control – our society is already witnessing the manifestations of what might be diagnosed as the ‘crisis of undercoordination’: vehicular and air traffic congestion, deterioration in the quality of municipal services, decay of urban centers, power blackouts, air, water and other environmental pollution, shortage of energy, unemployment, strikes, inflation, recession and depression, wars, depletion of earth’s non-renewable resources, and political and other economic crisis, etc. And there may well be the precursors of far more serious stresses and strains which lie ahead – stresses which may test to the limit the endurance of our democratic institutions – both in the developing and the developed countries.”

The solution that Gupta offered lies in Social Systems Theory. This concept has two aspects. Firstly, Social Systems Science, whose aim is to identify and understand the processes at work in society, i.e., why do we behave as we do? Secondly, Gupta uses the term Social Systems Engineering to describe the practical modification of existing feedback loops and other forms of causality to achieve a stated objective. That is, how to do what needs to be done for us to behave in a more sustainable, socially friendly, and environmentally friendly way.

The term, ‘Social Systems Engineering’, was coined in the 1970s and suggests that society should be steered in a mechanistic way by technocrats aloof from the rest of society. This is not possible or desirable. We are all subject to the same virtues and shortcomings, albeit in varying degrees, and the ideal technocratic leader does not exist.

It is also important to be aware that Social Systems Engineering can also be used to satisfy the needs of one group to the detriment of another. Its objectives should, therefore, be ethical and aim for improvements in the wellbeing of the natural environment and all of humanity.

So, in practice, the rational approach to steering society needs to be built into our democratic processes, rather than entrusted to the hands of a few. A better term might therefore, be ‘rational and informed democratic intervention’.

In his paper, Gupta concludes that “The strength of social systems engineering [or rational and informed democratic intervention] lies in its willingness to confront the basic issues and problems in the present day setup of socio-economic systems, and its boldness to borrow and integrate ideas and methodologies from the disciplines such as humanities and social sciences. We need system engineering, social scientists, and economists to spend more and more of their cooperative efforts in this direction. It can make a pragmatic contribution if we can bring a stability to our socio-economic system.”

To this I would add that, in order to fully understand our social processes, we also need to consider the evolutionary and ecological principles that have formed them.

Gupta’s paper was written in 1979, during a period of trade union unrest, and in it he refers to the UK as “the sick man of Europe”. However, times have moved on. Rightly or wrongly neo-liberalism has reduced the power of trade unions, and we currently face a new set of difficulties. Nevertheless, his recommendations remain relevant, albeit in a different context.

Reference

Gupta, M.M., 1980. “A Confluence of Feedback Loops in Social and Educational Structure: (in the context of developed and developing countries)”. Editors: De Giorgio, A. & C. Roveda, C. “Criteria for Selecting Appropriate Technologies Under Different Cultural, Technical and Social Conditions”, Pages 221-229. Pergamon. ISBN 9780080244556. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-024455-6.50031-7. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780080244556500317