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39. Reactions to Dark Leadership

Reactions to Dark Leadership

In every nation or organisation, leaders with dark personality traits, i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, or Machiavellianism, are more likely to rise to power than others. The primary interest of leaders with these traits is self-interest, rather than the interest of members of the nation or organisation that they lead. This frees them from ethical constraints when competing for leadership positions. It also frees them from the same constraints when determining the actions of their nation or organisation.

The reactions of members of the nation or organisation to dark leadership are as follows (Challoner, 2024).

  • They can support the leader. This involves entering into an informal contract with him or her to provide support and assistance in return for the benefits of delegated power.
  • They can practice a psychological defence mechanism such as denial. That is a failure to acknowledge that the leader has dark personality traits, despite evidence to the contrary.
  • They can avoid the leader by, for example, emigrating to another nation or joining another organisation. This is also, a psychological defence mechanism.
  • They can oppose the leader. However, this brings with it the risk of contra-satisfiers such as coercion, threats, or punishments.

The relative proportions of people who react in these ways depends on the culture of the nation or organisation. So, for example, if a culture regards the leader’s behaviour as normal or acceptable, the proportion that support him or her will be greater than in a culture that does not.

However, the greater the proportion of the population that support a dark leader, the lower the proportion that opposes him or her, and the more overt and extreme his or her behaviour will be. Furthermore, if they die or are deposed, it is more likely that another dark leader will take their place. On the other hand, the greater the opposition to a dark leader, the less overt and extreme his or her behaviour. However, the greater the tendency for denial and avoidance. So, dark leadership can still exist in nations and organisations that generally oppose it.

The English philosopher of science, Roy Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) recognises that society has two main strands: (a) the network of relationships and interactions between individuals and groups that forms the structure of society and is the subject of sociology; and (b) the individual human volition or agency that is the subject of psychology (Collier, 1994). A similar model, proposed by the English Sociologist, Margaret Archer, comprises three strands: Structure, Culture and Agency (Archer, 1995). In both models there is a feedback process in which society enculturates individuals and individuals enculture society. That is, society forms the individual’s role, values, norms, and beliefs through the processes of socialisation, social learning, cultural manipulation, etc. After a time delay and, sometimes, after alteration, individuals then propagate social structure along with their values, norms, and beliefs, into society. This process is continuously ongoing. Although it can result in social change, it is also possible for society to become trapped in a positive feedback loop in which, for example, a population’s reaction to dark leadership becomes ever more biassed towards support or opposition.

Examples are given in Daren Acemoglu and James A Robinson’s excellent and well researched book, “Why Nations Fail”. This book focuses on extractive, as opposed to inclusive institutions. That is, those institutions that extract wealth from a society for the benefit of a minority or external agents, as opposed to those that share it more equitably within the society. Institutions are groups or organisations that have values, norms, and beliefs. They also have a specific function in society, e.g., water supply or policing. So, an institution comprises both culture and structure. In much the same way as Bhaskar and Archer, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that there is a feedback loop between institutions and individuals that can trap a society in an extractive or an inclusive mode. They refer to the former as a vicious circle and the latter as a virtuous one.

However, extraction vs. inclusive institutions are just one example of vicious vs. virtuous circles. Other examples include: imperialism vs. respect for other nations; war vs. peaceful co-existence; corruption vs. integrity; elitism vs. egalitarianism; and extreme economic inequality vs. its alternative. Many nations and organisations currently behave in the former ways, and I will leave the reader to decide which. However, this behaviour is ultimately a result of support for dark leadership and the vicious circle that it creates. Pre-existing social structures, values, norms, and beliefs that allow these behaviours to flourish are learnt by individuals who, in turn, propagate them unaltered.

So, to avoid extraction, imperialism, war, corruption, extreme economic inequality, etc., it is necessary to alter the culture from one that supports it to one that opposes it. That change can be accomplished by demonstrating to those who support dark leadership that there is a better way to satisfy their needs. This, of course, means the provision of real opportunities for them to do so. In this way, the social structures, values, norms, and beliefs that prevent extraction, etc. from flourishing will be learnt and propagated, and a virtuous circle will be established. There will, of course, be resistance by established vested interests. So, the process will be a slow one requiring much care, patience, and persistence.

References

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A., 2012, “Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty”. London, Profile Books.

Archer, M., 1995. “Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach”. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Challoner, J.A., 2024. “A Theory of Society Derived from the Principles of Systems, Psychology Ecology and Evolution (Parts 1, 2 & 3) ”. https://rationalunderstanding.com/my-books/

Collier, A. 1994. “Critical Realism. An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy.” Verso, London, UK. ISBN 0-86091-437-2.

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12. The Risks to Nations of Leaders with Dark Pesonality Traits

The Risks to Nations of Leaders with Dark Personality Traits

Sectors can influence the general culture of a nation. Ronald Inglehart and the World Values Survey have identified two independent variables that define national culture: firstly, traditional vs. secular rational values, and secondly, survival vs. self-expression values (Inglehart, 2018). According to this perspective, the starting point for the cultural evolution of a nation comprises traditional values based largely on religion, and survival values due to the nation’s relative lack of wealth. At this starting point, the religious sector is the main influence on national culture, and this is still the case in many parts of the world. With industrialisation, the industrial and science sectors replaced religion as the main influence, and this resulted in a shift from traditional to secular rational values. More recently, in the West at least, there has been a shift from survival to self-expression values, with their emphasis on individuality as opposed to group cohesion. This is thought to have been brought about by the commercial and finance sectors and their concern for a lively consumer economy. Finally, we are on the cusp of another significant cultural change which will be brought about by the information technology sector, particularly with the introduction of artificial intelligence. There is much debate about where this will take us but, in practice, the destination is unknown.

Clearly, if influential sectors are led by individuals with dark personality traits, then there will be little concern for the wellbeing of society or the environment. Among the risks are the following.

  1. The risk of one sector holding undue influence over another, through its upper stratum’s membership of the establishment. For example, the ability of the religious and commercial sectors to influence the education of children in their own interest.
  2. The risk of one sector usurping the leadership of another and imposing its own ideology, e.g., the finance sector usurping the leadership of the industrial and commercial sector and imposing bottom line capitalism.
  3. The influence of a sector over government via its upper stratum’s membership of the establishment. This enables a sector to promote its own ideology and to influence government decisions in its interest. This can result in the promotion of the ideologies of powerful sectors and the suppression of more rational views. Examples include the gun lobby in the USA and the international oil lobby. Another example is the economic brinkmanship pervasive in the West today. This is evidenced by the steadily increasing wealth gap and levels of poverty, despite economic growth. This brinkmanship allows low wages and poverty to proliferate to a point where they begin to destabilise the consumer economy, but no further. However, because this leaves no resilience, economic shocks, such as the bank failures of 2008 and the COVID epidemic of 2020, do then impact on the economy.
  4. The potential for a sector to usurp democratic government, e.g., the replacement of a democratically elected government with the upper stratum of a military or religious sector, leading to a military dictatorship or theocracy.
  5. Competition and conflict arising from alliances between sectors and political parties. For example, the Spanish civil war was the consequence of an alliance of the catholic church, right-wing political parties, and the military on the one hand, and left-wing groups and parties on the other.
  6. Governments that suspend or create a false impression of democracy, engage in imperialism, and are corrupt.

These problems are rife throughout the world and, in the next article, I will offer some suggestions as to how to end them.

References

Inglehart, R., 2018. “Cultural Evolution”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108613880