Management Denial Syndrome

In a previous article at https://rational-understanding.com/2023/09/05/cultural-denial-or-conspiracy-of-silence/, I described the concepts of personal and cultural denial. In summary, denial is a psychological defense mechanism identified by Freud and his daughter. When we encounter a situation that causes us anxiety and about which we can do nothing, then we alleviate our anxiety by denying the existence of its cause.  Cultural denial is a much stronger form. When a group experience anxiety due to a common cause, then they reinforce one another’s denial through the process of socialization, i.e., punishment for mentioning the cause and reward for remaining silent about it.

However, there is another form of denial that is stronger yet. It is a very common organizational pathology that infects management hierarchies. To explain its cause, I must take a step back. The relationship between a junior manager and a senior one is an informal contract, whereby the junior manager supports the senior one in return for delegated power and the benefits of status. There is often much competition for management positions and the senior manager usually controls who will fill them. So, if there is a problem in the organisation, then a junior manager will be reticent to speak truth to power and report it to a senior one for fear of appearing in breach of the informal contract. This creates anxiety that can result in personal denial. That is, whilst we may be aware of the problem, we do not think about it or discuss it and do not realize that others are in the same position. There are, of course, those who do think about the problem but whose primary concern is to navigate it in their personal interest. In the hierarchy, almost all senior managers are junior to a yet more senior one. So, if the problem is reported to them, this affects their own denial, and they can discourage further reports with veiled threats. In this way, denial can infect a whole management hierarchy. The managers may know of the problem but are unwilling to talk about it, and so, it goes unaddressed. Furthermore, the hierarchy is unable to recognise that it suffers from this problem because denial is itself the subject of denial. Ultimately, recognition often only occurs when there is a catastrophe.

The classic example is the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster. A brief description of events leading up to this disaster is given below. However, there are many other more mundane examples, two of which I will also discuss.

The shuttle Columbia was launched in 2003 with seven astronauts aboard. During takeoff, a piece of insulating foam from the external fuel tank was seen to break off and strike the shuttle’s wing. Foam had broken off before and in one instance it dented the casing of one of the solid rocket boosters. However, this was the first time that foam had struck the shuttle. Concerns were raised by a relatively junior member of the NASA team and requests were passed up the line for remote inspection of the shuttle’s wing while it was in space. However, the prevailing view in NASA was that the foam was not sufficiently dense to have caused any significant damage. Three potential remote observations by aircraft, ground telescope and satellite were considered but rejected by the management team. A proposal for an external inspection by the astronauts was also rejected. All would have taken time out of the crew’s very tight schedule of scientific experiments, thereby harming NASA’s reputation. The junior member who raised the concern, when he pressed the matter, was told by his manager not to be “Chicken Little”, i.e., not to raise false concerns. A working group was established to consider the matter but complained that they did not have visual evidence on which to base their work. They were told to do their best without it and concluded that there was no safety concern. The astronauts were informed of the strike but again were told that there were no safety concerns.

As we know, when the shuttle returned to earth it broke up during re-entry with the loss of all seven astronauts. Even then, the denial persisted. Managers claimed that there must have been some other cause. Only when the external accident investigation team fired a similar piece of foam at a mock-up wing, and it punched a large hole was the denial overcome. Many in the management team then recognised their error and there were expressions of “mea culpa”. Others, however, went to ground. It is uncertain whether the lives of the crew could have been saved had the damage been investigated. However, it is clear that management denial prevented any attempt to do so.

More detail is given in the excellent documentary on BBC Iplayer entitled “The Space Shuttle that Fell to Earth” at https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episodes/m001tts2/the-space-shuttle-that-fell-to-earth.

Recently, I have had dealings with two UK public service organisations, both of which have a communication problem with their customers that impacts seriously on their ability to provide a satisfactory service. In one case there is a lack of feedback on reports from the public about safety concerns. This, of course, discourages them from making such reports in the future, and so, safety issues are probably going unaddressed. In the other example there is a lack of feedback on the progress of maintenance tasks not only to customers but also internally. As a result, costly mistakes are made, tasks go unaddressed, and the administrative costs involved in correcting this is high. Both organisations suffer the same denial syndrome. Although they both have complaints departments, they appear to see their role as one of defending management from criticism. They use various techniques among which are gaslighting, irrational arguments, and word games, i.e., implying one thing whilst actually saying another. It can be very time-consuming and frustrating to obtain the truth, and in so doing one can become labeled as the problem. So strong is the denial that the last-resort is often self-harm by, for example, simply not replying to the customer or asking them to contact an external regulator. Both organisations also employ “improvement managers”. However, whilst they may be aware of the problem and agree with the customer, they are also part of the management hierarchy, have a living to earn, and face the same difficulties in speaking truth to power.

Please, do not take these examples as implying that management hierarchies in the private sector are immune to the problem. Many do in fact suffer from it, although the topic of denial may be different, for example, a bullying, misogynistic, anti-social, or anti-environmental culture.

So, what is the solution to this syndrome? As we have seen from Columbia, a catastrophe will bring recognition. However, we should of course aim to avoid catastrophes. Bypassing the hierarchy, i.e., whistleblowing, is one solution, although it is notable that many organisations are now putting whistleblowing policies in place to control this. Leaving the organisation is another, although this will merely worsen the situation. A form of natural selection will take place in which those who are more susceptible to the syndrome remain, whilst those less susceptible leave. The only real solution is awareness of the problem, which I hope this article will encourage; better management training, including recognition of the syndrome; greater honesty with ourselves, even if this means suffering some anxiety; and greater honesty with others, especially those with power over us. There is a degree of personal risk in the latter and the way that a problem is flagged up will depend on the circumstances. However, it would clearly help to understand the benefits and disbenefits of acknowledgement vs. denial, and to emphasise the benefits of the former and the disbenefits of the latter.